Notes

Introduction

The epigraph comes from General of the Army Omar N. Bradley's testimony to Congress in the wake of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's relief from command in Korea. Bradley believed that the primary U.S. concern was not the Chinese enemy in Korea but the Soviet threat to exhausted, war-weary Western Europe. See Omar Nelson Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 558.


3. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict (Final Draft) (Washington, DC, 7 March 1989), 1—1 to 1—12.

Chapter 1


4. Bunge, South Korea, 29—34, 39; and Se-jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 89—91. Park, born in the countryside, had been commissioned through an officer candidate school in 1946. He had risen mainly through staff and intelligence work, although he did have the opportunity to attend the U.S. Army Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.


15. Ibid., 49.


17. Colonel Walter B. Clark, United States Army (ret.), telephone conversation with author from Charleston, South Carolina, 25 March 1980. Colonel Clark was the senior aide-de-camp and executive officer to General Charles H. Bonesteel III from September 1966 until August 1967.


19. Clark interview; and General Charles H. Bonesteel III, United States Army (ret.), interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert St. Louis, p. 328, Senior Officers Oral History Program Project 73—2, 1973, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The institute is cited hereafter as USAMHI.


21. Ibid., 335—36.

22. Clark interview.

23. Bonesteel interview, 328; and Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.


32. Senate, *Combat Readiness*, 3.


37. Bunge, *South Korea*, 52—54.


40. Bermudez, *North Korean Special Forces*, 87; and Bunge, *South Korea*, 58.

41. Bunge, *South Korea*, 49.

42. Ibid, 54, 61, 77, 86.


44. See appendix 3, annex 2, of this study for more details on the U.S.-ROK order of battle and likely deployment.


49. Senate, *Combat Readiness*, 4; Finley, *US Military Experience in Korea*, 60; and Colonel Charles L. Bachtel, United States Army (ret.), "The KATUSA Program," *Signal* 23 (December 1968): 42—44.


52. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 22; and Clark interview.


55. Senate, *Combat Readiness*, 9; and Bunge, *South Korea*, 231—32.

56. Paul S. Crane, M.D., "Korean Attitudes and Thought Patterns—Prepared for UNC/USFK," in the personal papers of Colonel Walter B. Clark, United States Army (ret.), Charleston,
SC; Bonesteel interview, 329, 338; and Clark interview. See also General Westmoreland’s similar observations in A Soldier Reports, 313–14.

57. Webster, “Morning Calm,” 18.
58. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 20; and Senate, Combat Readiness, 9.
60. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 105.

Chapter 2

The epigraph comes from Wesley Pruden, Jr., “Asia’s Other War,” 28.

1. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 114–15, 220; and Bonesteel interview, 329.
5. An, North Korea, 16–18; Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 31; and Bonesteel interview, 328.
8. Ibid., 116; and Clark interview. President Johnson visited Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia before landing in Korea.
9. Jenerette, “The Forgotten DMZ,” 35–36; Pruden, “Asia’s Other War,” 28; United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, 3d Brigade, “Annual Historical Supplement 1966,” USAMHI; Clark interview; “DOD Order Curbs ‘Premature’ Medal of Honor Information,” Army Times, 16 November 1966:5. Those who believe in the whims of fortune might observe that the ambushed patrol’s chain of command included descendants of two of the American military’s more unlucky generals. Major General George Pickett (U.S. 2d Infantry Division) was a cousin of the unfortunate Confederate who led the doomed charge at Gettysburg. Colonel Alan W. Jones, Jr. (3d Brigade) had been captured in the Battle of the Bulge when German forces surrounded the bulk of his father’s ill-starred 106th Infantry Division. In Pickett’s case, the general compounded his misfortune by insisting that his lost patrol had fought superbly. He even publicly recommended the award of a Medal of Honor to one of his dead soldiers. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara censured Pickett for this improper outburst.

16. United States, Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations: Larger Units, With Change 1 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 16 March 1966), 3. The contemporary core doctrinal manual from which FM 100-5 derived was the 1962 version of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations. It featured a slightly better theoretical discussion of the various types of warfare, although admitting that “the dividing line between cold war and limited war is neither distinct nor absolute.” FM 100-5 (1962), 5. Like FM 100-15, FM 100-5 then proceeds to list “local aggression,” “conventional war,” and “limited nuclear war” as examples of limited war, tying the whole sloppy bundle together by saying that “a limited war is any conflict which does not involve the unrestricted employment of all available resources.” Ibid., 5. Finally, just to muddy things up, FM 100-5 differs from FM 100-15 by indicating that cold war situations “can and often do” involve overt combat. Ibid., 155.

Most of the ideas, good and bad, in the other manuals discussed in this study can be traced back to phrases, sentences, and paragraphs in FM 100-5. See Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 39, for critical analysis of this manual.

17. FM 100-20, 1-10 to 1-12. Curiously, one part of FM 100-5 (1962) that did not find its way into other manuals was a brief discussion of situations “short of war,” listed as including “show of force, truce enforcement, international police action,” and “legal occupation.” FM 100-5 (1962), 156. Unfortunately, there was no specific definition or discussion of these operations. Instead, the authors supplied very general (and somewhat useful) guidance for all situations of this type. This general guidance did percolate down to the segment on “Cold War” missions in the divisional manual.

18. FM 100-15, 35—37.


21. United States, Department of the Army, FM 61-100, The Division (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, November 1968), 12—15 to 12—18. Indicative of the lack of doctrinal development during the Vietnam era, this manual repeats almost verbatim the entire “Cold War” segment referenced in note 19 above. The only notable change, aside from some adjustments for grammatical clarity, is the substitution of the term “stability operations” for “counterinsurgency.”

22. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 197, features the terse Westmoreland quote concerning fire power as the answer to counterinsurgency. See also Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946—76, Leavenworth Papers no. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, United States Army Command and General Staff College, August 1979), 39.

23. Bonesteel interview, 335.


29. Bonesteel interview, 331–32, 335.
32. Guthrie, “Korea: The Other DMZ,” 19. See appendix 4 of this study for a recapitulation of significant firefights involving U.S. forces.
33. Ibid., 19–20.
34. Bonesteel interview, 337.
35. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.
39. Bonesteel interview, 333; Pruden, “Asia’s Other War,” 30; and Guthrie, “Korea: The Other DMZ,” 22. Chain-link fence, although commonly available, costs much more per meter than barbed wire.
40. Bonesteel interview, 336–37.
41. Ibid., 332–33.
43. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 16; and Bonesteel interview, 331.
44. Bonesteel interview, 331.
47. Bonesteel, “On Korea’s DMZ,” 61; and Bonesteel interview, 334, 337.
50. FM 31-55, 7–6.
51. Ibid.
53. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 117.
55. Bunge, South Korea, 245–46.
56. Ibid., 245, 247.
57. Bonesteel, “On Korea’s DMZ,” 60. Note the photograph of troops from the ROK 26th Infantry Regiment aboard U.S. helicopters from I Corps (Group).
58. Bonesteel, “U.S.-South Korean Partnership,” 62; Bonesteel interview, 332; and Summers, On Strategy, 47.
59. Bonesteel interview, 332; and Summers, On Strategy, 47.

60. William Loomis, “Is a Renewal of the Korean Conflict Imminent?” DATA 13 (June 1968):12–13. The Taebaek and Chiri Mountain areas had both experienced much guerrilla activity during the Korean War. Forces employed in these regions included portions of the U.S. 1st Marine Division. See Cable, A Conflict of Myths, 39–41.

61. Bunge, South Korea, 187–89; and Bonesteel interview, 332.


Chapter 3

The epigraph comes from Chapin, “Success Story in South Korea,” 566.

1. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.


5. Ibid., 18–19; Guthrie, “Korea: The Other DMZ,” 22; Bonesteel interview, 339–40; Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 32; United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, 1st Brigade, “Annual Historical Supplement 1968,” USAMHI; and United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, 2d Brigade, “Annual Historical Supplement 1968,” USAMHI.


7. Ibid., 32; Stefans, “Confessions of a Red Agent,” 17; and Bonesteel interview, 340.


12. Bonesteel interview, 341; and Clark interview.


32. AR 672-5-1, 28; and United States, Department of the Army, AR 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 20 March 1987), 85, 88—89. To this day, the Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army, retains authority to award the Combat Infantryman and Combat Medical Badges. This is the only command so authorized.

33. There were 295 official visitors during the first half of the year, during the most serious period of crisis; these included thirteen Congressional delegations, one cabinet member, twenty-seven civilian groups, and seventy-five high-level Department of Defense, service department, and military visitors.


38. Finley, *US Military Experience in Korea*, 122, 125.


44. Ibid., 53.

45. Ibid., 57.


47. Ibid., 122.

48. Bonesteel, “U.S.-South Korean Partnership,” 60; and Bonesteel interview, 333—34.


55. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 120–22; and Webster, “Morning Calm,” 9, which indicates that the ROKs captured 1,245 agents during 1968.


57. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 33–34; and Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 128.

58. Bonesteel interview, 334.

Chapter 4

The epigraph comes from Binder, “The Porous War,” 57.

1. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 128.


4. An, North Korea, 16–18.


8. Webster, “Morning Calm,” 9–10; and Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 35.


10. Ibid., 155; An, North Korea, 18; Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea, 76; and Dan Oh Kong, Leadership Chance in North Korean Politics (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1988), 7. Kim Il-sung's quest for personal loyalty among key subordinates included the elevation of younger brother Kim Yong-chu and son Kim Jong-il. The latter assumed control of the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Bureau in 1971 and is now Kim Il-sung's designated successor.


12. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea, 76.


15. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 129.


17. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 129.


21. Richard E. Bradshaw, “Major Determinants of North Korea Foreign Policy,” in *The Politics of North Korea*, edited by Jae Kyu Park and Jung Gun Kim (Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University, 1979), 190. For the first public admission of a possible change in the north, see Takashi Ota, “North Korea Held to Shift Tactics,” *New York Times*, 21 September 1969:8. Ota’s article offered the first public discussion of North Korean purges and a possible shift to political agitation rather than unconventional warfare. The article, based on South Korean and UNC sources, also featured the caveat that “any time the Americans present a target of opportunity, the North Koreans will seize it.” Overall, it was an amazingly accurate piece of journalism. See also Bermudez, *North Korean Special Forces*, 76. Bermudez notes these other names for the 8th Special Purpose Corps: 8th Special Duties Army Group, Light Infantry Army Group, Reconnaissance Army Group, 3729th Unit, and Strategic Forces Command. This gives some clue as to the care accorded to operational security in North Korea.


46. 2ID, 3Bde, “AHS 1969.”
49. Ibid., 130–35.

Chapter 5


11. Clark interview.
14. Perkins, “U.S. Force Structure,” 242—44. U.S. forces operated independently of the country team for extended periods in Honduras (Joint Task Force Bravo, 1984 to the present), Lebanon (U.S. Multinational Force, 1982—84), and the Persian Gulf (Joint Task Force—Middle East, 1987—88), among other examples. Although not required, close liaison with the embassy was kept in all of these cases, just as in Korea during 1966—69.
18. FM 100-20, 1—11.
19. Ibid., 2—30, 5—2
20. Ibid., 2–30.

21. FM 31-55 summarizes the results of the UNC border defense operations of 1966–69. The
barest summary of FM 31-55 (now out of print) can be found in the current FM 100-20,
E-18 to E-20.

22. FM 100-20, 1–9.


**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUNC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>EUSA</td>
<td>U.S. Eighth Army</td>
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<td>HDRF</td>
<td>Homeland Defense Reserve Force</td>
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<td>KATUSA</td>
<td>Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army</td>
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<td>KIA</td>
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<td>Korean Military Advisory Group</td>
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<td>LIC</td>
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Major Daniel P. Bolger is an infantry officer, commissioned in 1978 from The Citadel. He served as a platoon leader, company executive officer, battalion S4, and rifle company commander in the 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 34th Infantry, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Following graduate school at the University of Chicago, where he earned his doctorate in history, he taught Russian and Soviet history at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. Major Bolger graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1990 and currently serves as a battalion operations officer (S3) in the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, in the Republic of Korea. He has written three other books: *Dragons at War: 2-34th Infantry in the Mojave* (1986), *Americans at War 1975—1986: An Era of Violent Peace* (1988), and *Feast of Bones* (1990), a military novel.

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From November 1966 until December 1969, American and South Korean forces battled North Korean special operations teams across the length and breadth of the peninsula. The Second Korean Conflict featured small-scale skirmishes along the uneasy Demilitarized Zone, spectacular terrorist strikes, the seizure of the USS *Pueblo*, and several determined North Korean efforts to foment a viable insurgency. The United States and the Republic of Korea prevailed in this low-intensity conflict.

Why did the United States and its Korean allies win? This Leavenworth Paper offers a case study in how an operational-level commander, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of low-intensity conflict in his theater. Bonesteel and his United States and Korean subordinates crafted a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that eventually defanged North Korea's aggressive unconventional warfare campaign. This accomplishment is even more remarkable in light of the many circumstances that severely cramped Bonesteel's options. Mediocre, conventionally oriented allied forces, a volatile Korean political scene, half-baked American doctrine, and the overarching specter of a second Asian land war all affected the formulation and execution of the American-Korean response to North Korea's bold provocations.

Low-intensity conflict remains a serious concern for a U.S. Army oriented on more dangerous, less likely midintensity wars. While the Korean situation of 1966—69 was certainly unique, this analysis of the allied performance in a forgotten conflict offers some important conclusions that may prove valuable to those confronted with the continuing challenges of waging—and winning— America's small wars.